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The Case for Permanent Residency for Frontline Workers
MOLLIE GERVER University of Essex, United Kingdom
This article presents the case for granting permanent residency to those experiencing significant risksthroughout the COVID-19 pandemic to increase citizens’ safety. Increasing safety comes in manyforms: directly, as when doctors, paramedics, and nurses assist patients, and indirectly, as when
farmworkers produce life-sustaining food, garbage collectors protect sanitation, and social workers
respond to emergency calls. A range of such workers are owed gratitude-derived duties from citizens that
are best fulfilled via permanent residency. I defend this claim first for authorized migrants and then for
unauthorized migrants, whose presence citizens would consent to if they were aware of the benefits they
provide. Finally, I defend the claim that many frontline workers not owed gratitude are owed duties of
justice, acquiring rights similar to those of permanent residency.
INTRODUCTION
D uring the spread of COVID-19, Nancy Silvawas picking clementines in California, cogni-zant of her close proximity to coworkers. This
close proximity, experienced by tens of thousands of
agricultural workers in California, meant she was
roughly three times more likely to become infected
than the average American. Ms. Silva continued des-
pite these risks, grateful for the temporary visa pro-
vided for her efforts, as part of temporary reforms to
protect food security during the pandemic (Jordan
2020; Villarejo 2020).
A similar reformwas instituted in theUK formedical
workers, with year-long visa extensions offered to
National Health Service (NHS) employees. More
recently, a coalition in the U.S. Congress proposed
green cards to 40,000 nurses and doctors, and a coali-
tion in the UK parliament proposed permanent resi-
dency to all NHS staff (Economic Times 2020; Siddique
2020). Some have called for permanent residency for all
on the front line, including sanitation and agricultural
workers. As one op-ed writer explained, it’s “the least
we can do … in repayment for their service and
sacrifices” (Moran 2020).
This article presents the case for granting permanent
residency to frontline workers, defined here as those
experiencing substantial risks throughout the pandemic
to substantially increase citizens’ safety. Increasing
safety comes in many forms: directly, as when doctors
and nurses assist patients, and indirectly, as when farm
workers produce life-sustaining food, garbage collect-
ors protect sanitation, and social workers respond to
emergency calls.1
I initially present a gratitude-based case for perman-
ent residency for frontline workers. The first
section presents a general theory of gratitude; I then
demonstrate how gratitude can ground rights to per-
manent residency for a range of authorized frontline
migrants. Following this, I argue that the gratitude-
based case applies to unauthorized migrants who have
citizens’ “hypothetical consent.” This refers to front-
line workers whom citizens would consent to working if
aware of the benefits such migrants provide.
In drawing on the value of gratitude, this article relies
on a value yet to be fully articulated within broader
ethical debates on immigration. These broader debates
focus on alternative values, including: reciprocity, where
migrants’ contributions ground the right to permanent
residency (Shachar 2009; Song 2018; Sullivan 2019;
Rubio-Marin 2000);membership, wheremigrants’ inter-
actions with citizens ground the right to permanent
residency (Carens 2013; Shachar and Hirschl 2014);
and equality, where migrants’ vulnerability grounds
the right to permanent residency (Berg 2016; Lenard
and Straehle 2010; Walzer 1983). In the second half of
this article, I demonstrate that these alternative values
ground rights to permanent residency formany frontline
workers who lack gratitude-based grounds, with the
value of equality particularly apt at demonstrating that
unauthorized migrants lacking citizens’ hypothetical
consent would be exploited if denied permanent resi-
dency. However, these values do not apply to many
frontline workers who do have gratitude-based grounds.
In this sense, gratitude remains essential for a complete
understanding of frontline workers’ rights.
The final two sections argue that gratitude is essential
for immigration ethics more generally. Firefighters, sol-
diers, and even nurses who work night shifts often
assume substantial risks while helping citizens (Vetter
et al. 2016), as do some nonmigrants abroad. I argue that
the duty of gratitude implies that high-income states
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1 While some such individuals are not termed “frontline workers” by
all governments, so long as individuals face substantial risks in

























































































































have a duty, beyond COVID-19, to increase the number
of individuals who are granted permanent residency.
A THEORY OF GRATITUDE FOR
RISK-TAKERS
This section describes a theory of gratitude for one
individual benefiting from another, followed by a the-
ory of gratitude for one group benefiting from another.
Two-Person Cases
Humans generally owe gratitude to those they benefit
from, especially when those they benefit from risk their
lives. More specifically, a beneficiary owes gratitude to
a benefactor when
1. the benefactor freely assumes life-threatening risks
to increase the beneficiary’s odds of survival;
2. the benefactor’s intention is not merely to strategic-
ally and personally gain from the beneficiary;
3. the beneficiary has no right that the benefactor take
on risks she assumes; and
4. the beneficiary has consented, or would have con-
sented if possible, to the benefactor assuming risks.
These conditions are not all necessary for owing
gratitude, but they are jointly sufficient.2 For example,
imagine Beatrice dives into the ocean to save Charles,
who is drowning, because she cares about him.
Imagine, also, that Charles holds no right to being
saved given life-threatening risks for Beatrice, but
would have consented to being saved if asked. It seems
he owes her gratitude.
In demonstrating gratitude, Charles should not pro-
vide money alone. He should not arrive on shore, hand
over £100, and walk away without a word. This would
imply that their relationship is not one between a
human risking her life for another, but of one human
merely transacting with another.
To express gratitude for the risks she assumed, he
ought to tell Beatrice that he appreciates what she did
(Camenisch 1981; Von Tevenar 2006) and demonstrate
concern for her welfare, given how much she has done
for his. He should ask how she is fairing, having just
risked her life. Moreover, given how high the stakes
were, he should continue inquiring into her welfare
without some specified end-date. He should not ask
how she is once, and then ignore her if they run into
each other, or say, “I will inquire into your welfare for
one year, after which my duties to inquire into your
welfare have been exhausted.” Such an expiration date
fails to demonstrate that their relationship is not what it
was prior to her saving him, given the risks she under-
took.
If he ought to demonstrate concern, he ought to
additionally offer to keep some line of communication
open so that such demonstrations are possible. While
he needn’t forever inquire into her welfare, he should
not block her on social media, refuse to take her calls,
and walk down a different street to avoid talking with
her. In other words, he ought to at least keep some
passive line of communication open.
Importantly, to demonstrate concern for Beatrice’s
welfare he should take actions that protect this welfare.
He should avoid welfare-reducing harm that would
otherwise be permissible, and provide welfare-
enhancing aid that would otherwise be supererogatory
(Manela 2015; Terrance 1993; Walker 1980). More
specifically, he ought to avoid harm and provide aid
with certain characteristics.
One characteristic concerns costs: aid owed in grati-
tude needn’t exceed an upper threshold of costs. For
example, if Beatrice needs a ride to the hospital, or
lacks money for one month’s rent, Charles ought to
help if costs fall below a threshold that is higher than the
threshold for someone who never risked her life for his,
all else being equal. While he needn’t donate a kidney,
he might need to donate some of his time and money
(Hartley 2014; Von Tevenar 2006).
The same likely holds true for harm avoidance.
Imagine Charles and Beatrice own competing cafes,
and Charles can harm Beatrice by telling customers
how unimpressive her coffee is. He should avoid doing
so if costs for him fall below a given threshold (perhaps
experiencing only a modest reduction in profits), but
might still be permitted to criticize her coffee if neces-
sary for keeping his business afloat. While the precise
threshold of costs is debatable, the costs are higher than
had Beatrice never risked her life for his, but not
without limit.
There is a second characteristic to welfare protection
for gratitude: even if aid and harm-avoidance are only
obligatory until a given threshold of costs, this threshold
does not dissipate with time, at least when owing grati-
tude for surviving. Imagine Beatrice only asks for help
20 years later, lacking sufficient nutrition. Charles
should not respond, “I owe you nothing, because
20years havepassed sinceyou savedmy life.” If 20years
have passed, Charles has now lived 20 years because of
Beatrice.While total obligatory assistance over 20 years
is limited to some threshold—perhaps he needn’t buy
her food every month for 20 years—this threshold has
no expiration date, because the passage of time
increases rather than diminishes benefits for Charles.
A final characteristic concerns competing consider-
ations. Charles needn’t protect Beatrice’s welfare if he
has weightier moral reasons to protect others instead,
holding an all-things-considered duty to help them
instead of her. If Beatrice needsmoney for onemonth’s
rent, Charles is not obligated to pay this rent if another
individual to whom he has a duty to help requires
money to survive, and Charles can either help them
or Beatrice.
In short, a beneficiary owing gratitude to a benefac-
tor for risking her life ought to:
1. express concern over her welfare when running into
her,
2 This is consistent with a range of theories of gratitude (Manela 2015;

























































































































2. keep at least passive modes of communication with
her open, and
3. protect her welfare by avoiding harm and providing
necessary aid that
(a) costs equal to or less than a given threshold,
(b) does not expire at a given point, and
(c) does not clash with a competing and weightier
reason to protect the welfare of another agent
instead.
The above concerns cases where a benefactor has no
obligation to risk her life. Some claim gratitude is not
owed toward those with a duty to save others, particu-
larly when those saved have a correlative right to be
saved (Callahan 1982; Heyd 1982). Imagine Beatrice is
a lifeguard with a duty to save others and with Charles
having a right to be saved.
Even if no duty of gratitude is owed in such cases, a
duty of gratitude would be owed if Beatrice took risks
beyond those her professional duties demanded, in that
she would not be blameworthy for avoiding such risks.
A lifeguard may have a duty to assume more risks than
nonprofessionals, but needn’t assume substantial risks
to her life; lifeguards undergo training precisely to
ensure risks during rescues are lower than those non-
professionals would typically assume if engaging in
similar rescues. If Beatrice’s risks are not substantially
reduced from her training—perhaps there is a major
storm—she likely has no duty to take on such risks. If
she does nonetheless, Charles owes her gratitude.
If gratitude is owed for risks that are supererogatory
for a profession, someone can be owed gratitude even if
not risking her life in a biological sense. An individual
might risk losing the life she once lived, including her
ability to realize important life projects or conceptions
of the good. When this risk is supererogatory, a similar
duty of gratitude is owed.3 If Beatrice would unlikely
die, but be exposed to dyspnea-causing cyanobacteria
in the water—constraining her ability to pursue import-
ant life goals—Charles would owe her a duty of grati-
tude.
At least, it seems he would owe her gratitude if she
freely exposed herself to risks. Imagine this wasn’t the
case, and she saved Charles to avoid being fired by her
employer and destitute. Some might feel she would be
wronged by her employer, but not owed gratitude from
Charles. This is because some claim those coerced into
assistance are not owed gratitude: if X puts a gun to Y’s
head and tells her to risk her life to save Z’s, Z may
appreciate Y saving him, but owes her no gratitude
(Simmons 1981; McConnell 2017). While nobody is
putting a gun to Beatrice’s head, her employer’s threat
may have dire consequences, and so constitute coer-
cion, undermining any gratitude owed by Charles.
In such cases, while no gratitude is owed if Beatrice
takes risks solely because of her employer’s threat, if
her motivation is not this threat—she just cares about
helping those drowning—Charles owes her gratitude.
Though she was subject to coercion, she took risks not
because of coercion, but out of concern for his life. If
she took risks out of concern for his life, Charles ought
to demonstrate concern for hers, and fulfil the usual
duties of gratitude.
This raises the question of what should be done when
it is not clear if someone is motivated by coercion.
There are good reasons to presume someone is not
motivated by coercion if they claim they are not, and
establishing if this is true would itself violate duties of
gratitude. If Beatrice faces coercion but is motivated
only by concern for Charles, and Charles asks her to
answer a battery of questions to deduce her motives
before demonstrating gratitude, such interrogation
might be particularly psychologically harmful. If
enough harm is incompatible with duties of gratitude,
the interrogation may itself violate duties of gratitude.
Moreover, such interrogation may be wrongful for
reasons independent of gratitude-based duties. If it
seems likely Beatrice saved Charles only to avoid being
fired and destitute, interrogating her in particular may
bewrongfully discriminatory.Wrongful discrimination,
it is broadly accepted, occurs when disadvantaged
groups are treated in a demeaning or worse-off manner
in virtue of being worse-off already (Hellman 2008;
Lippert-Rasmussen 2014). Such discrimination may
arise when claiming some workers’ desperate circum-
stances are evidence that their motives for taking risks
are not to help others. If a subset of lifeguards had few
other choices of profession, and it was assumed they
were not motivated by concern for those saved, inter-
rogating only their motives would be wrong. If they
claim they are notmotivated by the threat of being fired
and destitute, there are good reason to take them at
their word.
There remain cases where an individual is clearly
assuming risks just to avoid being fired and destitute,
admitting to this fact or never claiming otherwise. In
such cases, no gratitude is owed. Instead, duties of
justice are owed, derived from potentially exploitative
contracts; Beatrice is exploited if risking death or dys-
pnea to avoid destitution from unemployment. Like
with gratitude, special duties are owed to such individ-
uals beyond giving money. I defend this claim in the
second half of the article.
For now, we can at least conclude this: agents assum-
ing supererogatory risks to save others, and doing so
freely or claiming coercion is not their motivation,
ought to be shown gratitude.
Groups
The above focuses on two-party cases. Gratitude is also
relevant for groups. If Charles ought to demonstrate
gratitude when Beatrice assumes undue risks to help
him survive, a group of individuals ought to demon-
strate gratitude toward another group, if each member
of the latter group assumes undue risks to substantially
increase survival odds for all members of the group
benefiting. At least, they ought to be shown gratitude if
they take risks freely, or to help beneficiaries. For
example, imaginemany lifeguards sail out to savemany
drowning at sea, freely taking risks above those3 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
























































































































required of their profession. Each lifeguard engages in
nontransactional assistance, given that she goes beyond
the professional obligations of her contract. This is true
even if she does not personally increase any individual’s
odds of survival a great deal, merely being part of a
group substantially increasing such odds. If she engages
in nontransactional assistance, she is owed gratitude
not reducible to a transfer of money.
Based on this reasoning, gratitude can even be owed
by beneficiaries never needing help. Consider life-
guards taking supererogatory risks in a town where
all residents swim. If most residents never end up
needing assistance, but would obtain assistance if the
need arose, and they have even moderate chances of
the need arising, everyone’s survival odds can increase
significantly. If they have a 1/100 chance of drowning
without a lifeguard, but a 1/3,000 chance with a life-
guard, lifeguards being willing and actually taking
supererogatory risks significantly increases residents’
odds of survival. If such residents consent to lifeguards
taking on supererogatory risks in saving anyone need-
ing help, they owe gratitude even if never saved.
The same conclusion arises when different profes-
sionals assume risks. Consider a town with not only
lifeguards, but firefighters risking their lives in burning
buildings, and social workers risking their lives
responding to domestic violence. Even if a given resi-
dent never requires a lifeguard, firefighter, or social
worker, the risks all workers assumemean any resident
will be assisted if the need arises. The more life-saving
workers there are, the more safe a given resident is. If
residents’ risks are substantially reduced because of
these workers’ supererogatory risks, residents owe
them gratitude.
Note that this argument does not appeal to contro-
versial claims about group duties. Some claim that
groups like polities can have duties not reducible to
the duties of each group member (Collins 2019; Hin-
driks 2018). My claim is more modest: individual group
members, where each member benefits, each owe
gratitude to all members of a second group, when each
member of the second group personally takes on mor-
ally nonobligatory risks, collectively reducing risks for
each member of the first group. If each member of the
first group owes gratitude, they ought to demonstrate
concern for each member of the risk-taking group,
including keeping some type of communication with
them open, and protecting their welfare.
At least, protecting welfare is obligatory if costs fall
below a given threshold. Here, group cases diverge
from two-person cases.While in two-person cases there
is some upper threshold of costs the beneficiary must
bear depending on his circumstances, in group cases the
threshold varies between beneficiaries depending on
their circumstances relative to each other. This is
because of general principles of fairness.
Principles of fairness—outside the scope of gratitude
alone—hold that responsibility allocation ought to
account for relative privileges. For example, the
wealthy generally must contribute more than others
in helping individuals in need, and a given wealthy
person’s obligatory costs may be greater the fewer
other wealthy individuals there are. It is also broadly
accepted that duties can arise because of others’ failure
to do their fair share, as when the wealthy ought to end
global poverty on their own, do not, and the middle-
class ought to “take up the slack” and contribute some
resources (Karnein 2014; Stemplowska 2016). Apply-
ing these theories to the lifeguards above, if a lifeguard
is in grave need, and gratitude requires that she receive
assistance from beneficiaries of her supererogatory
risks, wealthy beneficiaries are likely required to bear
greater costs in helping her compared to poor benefi-
ciaries, with the upper costs anyone is required to bear
varying depending on the wealth distribution amongst
beneficiaries, and whether cobeneficiaries do their fair
share; if wealthy beneficiaries unfairly refuse to help,
middle-class beneficiaries might be required to give a
little more. Fairness applies to benefactors as well: the
welfare a benefactor is entitled to obtain varies depend-
ing on howwell-off other benefactors are. For example,
if years pass and no lifeguards need help, except one
requiring costly cancer treatment, perhaps beneficiar-
ies should pay for her treatment, but not if all lifeguards
require this treatment, such that total costs would
exceed the obligatory threshold for demonstrating
gratitude.
GRATITUDE TO FRONTLINE WORKERS
The above theory has far-reaching implications for
frontline workers. This section focuses on implications
for frontline workers with certain characteristics. The
first two characteristics, to be removed in the next two
sections, are that the workers are authorized to work in
the country, and assuming risks that citizens have or
would consent to being assumed on their behalf. In
other words, just like someone benefiting from life-
guards cannot necessarily consent to lifeguards’ assist-
ance, but would consent if asked, citizens cannot
necessarily consent to frontline workers’ actions, but
would consent if asked. This is a reasonable assumption
for most authorized frontline migrants, given wide-
spread public support for frontline workers’ actions
(Ballinger 2020).
A third characteristic is that the workers are taking
risks beyond thosemorally required of their profession,
as when health care workers suddenly find themselves
at risk of dying from COVID-19, or experiencing
“Long-COVID,” including extreme fatigue and dam-
aged lungs (Logue et al. 2021).
I further assume, and will continue to in the next
section, that the workers would (a) not be fired and
destitute if refusing to take risks or (b) even if they
would, they claim to bemotivated by concern for others
and (c) establishing if they speak truthfully would be
wrong for reasons described in the last section. For
example, a nurse might be fired and deported to a poor
country if refusing to take risks, but claim to be assum-
ing risks solely to help patients. Similarly, an agricul-
tural worker might be destitute if she didn’t work, but
claim she takes risks to ensure food security for citizens,

























































































































are potentially lying, it would seem wrong to interro-
gate them to establish their motives. This would likely
cause harm that violated duties of gratitude and non-
discrimination: if harming already-disadvantaged indi-
viduals is often wrongfully discriminatory, as argued in
the last section, it might bewrongfully discriminatory to
interrogate workers because of their extremely con-
strained options.
Finally, I assume that the workers in question collect-
ively and substantially increase most citizens’ survival
odds. Some do so by slowing the disease’s spread, redu-
cing citizens’ odds of infection, as when delivery drivers
reduce citizens’ congregation in shops. Others decrease
risks by providing necessary help as described in the last
section. For example, health care workers ensure citi-
zens can receive medical care if the need arises, even if
they never need this care. This is true not only for
COVID-19 treatment: nurses, doctors, and technicians
risking their lives during a pandemic help with a range of
life-risking medical conditions. If healthcare substan-
tially increases most citizens’ odds of survival, including
citizens never requiring care, then health care workers
facing risks during a pandemic collectively and substan-
tially increase most citizens’ odds of survival.
The same holds true for workers contributing to
general safe environments. Garbage collectors risk
their lives during a pandemic to ensure sanitation that
(pandemic or not) increases citizens’ odds of survival,
and agricultural workers risk their lives during a pan-
demic to ensure food security that (pandemic or not)
increases citizens’ odds of survival (FAO 2020).
Importantly, all three—health care, sanitation, and
agricultural workers—contribute to even greater com-
bined increases in citizens’ survival odds.
If most citizens experience substantially increased
survival odds because of these frontline workers’ con-
tributions, and each worker experiences risks above
those morally required of their profession (and does so
freely or presumably to help citizens), citizens owe
them duties of gratitude. This requires demonstrating
concern for frontline worker’s welfare, keeping some
type of communicationwith workers open, and protect-
ing workers’ welfare.
This raises the question of how concern, communi-
cation, and protection are implemented. Implementa-
tion challenges were largely put aside in last section’s
discussion, but highly relevant when very large groups
benefit from other very large groups. Given this feature
of frontline worker assistance, citizens cannot and
ought not directly demonstrate gratitude in the way
that Charles demonstrates gratitude to Beatrice.
This is for multiple reasons. One relates to privacy:
imagine a nurse opening her door to find millions of
thankful citizens offering to stay in touch and provide
any assistance she needs. The offer might violate her
privacy, as would requiring her to tell crowds of well-
intentioned citizens whenever she was in dire need.
Even if privacy were ensured, there would be epistemic
barriers: a given citizen rarely knows who saved his life,
given the collective and/or indirect nature of frontline
assistance. If he passes a former frontline worker living
on the street, he will not know whether he benefited
from her, or if she was a frontline worker at all. There
would be related coordination problems. With poten-
tially millions of frontline workers, the diversity of
needs would not be conducive to isolated acts of kind-
ness found in two-party cases.
Epistemic and coordination problems can addition-
ally create problems concerning fairness. If establishing
one’s personal duties of gratitude requires establishing
one’s relative wealth, and whether others are doing
their fair share, each beneficiary would struggle to
independently establish their specific obligations. It
would be difficult for each citizen to know how well-
off she was compared to others, what others were
doing, and what beneficiaries needed, and so difficult
to know what costs she must bear and to whom she
must bear these costs.
There is a final problem relating to control, particu-
larly applicable tomigrants.As noted in the last section,
gratitude requires avoiding harm entailing below-
threshold costs. Citizens often contribute to harms of
frontline worker migrants. This is because citizens pay
taxes supporting immigration enforcement, including
border officers engaging in extreme violence during
deportation (Carens 2013; Lister 2020; Sager 2017).
Even when violence is avoided, taxes contribute to
visceral psychological pain workers might experience
if instructed to leave the state where they risked their
lives for others. If showing gratitude requires avoiding
some harm, but citizens lack control over harms they
contribute to, it is difficult for citizens to control their
ability to show gratitude.
Given epistemic, privacy, coordination, and control
barriers for citizens, this poses problems for the state as
a whole. This is because the state and its institutions
have moral reasons to ensure that citizens can fulfil
their duties in general, at least when these duties are
held by most citizens and especially weighty (Quong
2010; Raz 1988; Tadros 2016). If citizens’ duties of
gratitude toward frontline workers are especially
weighty, states ought to institute policies helping citi-
zens fulfil these duties. They should therefore help
citizens avoid the epistemic, privacy, coordination,
and control barriers toward fulfilling these duties.
There are good reasons to suppose the policy most
conducive to overcoming the four barriers is granting
permanent residency to frontline workers. By “per-
manent residency” I mean visas permitting frontline
workers to
1. work in the state without being deported,
2. engage in public communicative acts, such as pro-
testing and raising court petitions, and
3. obtain access to essential welfare provisions, includ-
ing unemployment benefits, education, and public
housing for those in need.4
4 In countries where only citizenship brings about protection from
deportation, the right to publicly communicate, and access to welfare
provisions, frontline workers ought to be granted citizenship. In other
words, I use “permanent residency” as shorthand for a status incorp-
orating the above three aspects.
























































































































Each aspect helps citizens fulfil their duties of grati-
tude. The first (1) ensures citizens avoid contributing to
harms via deportation. In theory, of course, states could
engage in deportation while ensuring citizens fulfill
duties of gratitude, by ensuring harms fromdeportation
were minimized, up until costs of avoiding harm fell
below the obligatory threshold for duties of gratitude.
While this is theoretically possible, individual enforce-
ment agents widely ignore official state policies, even
when legislatures introduce more humane policies
(Sager 2017). This leads to disproportionate harms in
general (Lister 2020). If harms are disproportionate in
general, they are disproportionate for agents owed
gratitude, given that harm permitted against those
owed gratitude is less than harm permitted against
those not owed gratitude (all else being equal). For
states to ensure citizens are not contributing to imper-
missible harm, thus ensuring citizens fulfil their duties
of gratitude, states ought to grant permanent residency
to frontline workers.
The second aspect (2) refers to public actions that are
directed at capturing the public’s attention, including
protesting, striking at work, talking to reporters,
approaching policymakers, organizing community
meetings, and appealing to neighbors and friends.
The opportunity to pursue these actions helps citizens
andmigrants communicate on a public level, evenwhen
personal communication is not possible or desirable.
More specifically, migrants pursuing such actions while
they are physically present in the state can more effect-
ively gain citizens’ attention (Beltran 2009; Gloash-
Boza 2014), such that citizens can more easily express
concern in response. Once deported, electronic com-
munication—Zoom and blogs—are thin alternatives
for frontline workers communicating with citizens,
and for citizens demonstrating concern by communi-
cating back.5
The above explains why being physically present is
important for harm-avoidance and communication. It
does not explain why frontline workers should access
(3), essential welfare provisions. Many frontline work-
ers come from countries offering essential provisions,
and can return to their home countries if in need.While
this may be true, if frontline workers must leave their
country-of-residence to obtain such provisions, they
will be unable to engage in public communicative acts
that help citizens fulfil their duties of gratitude. More-
over, being unable to access aid in the country where
they risked their lives diminishes citizens’ ability to
demonstrate gratitude. Just like Charles fails to dem-
onstrate gratitude if he is unwilling to provide aid to
Beatrice, even if Beatrice never needs this aid because
another individual will provide it instead, citizens fail to
demonstrate gratitude if they are unwilling to provide
aid to frontlineworkers, even if workers never need this
aid because another state will provide it instead. By
ensuring welfare provisions, citizens communicate a
willingness they otherwise do not communicate, thus
demonstrating gratitude they otherwise do not demon-
strate.
Some might suppose that, though permitting con-
tinued residency while obtaining assistance is neces-
sary, usual welfare provisions are not. States could just
send a large one-off check equal to the maximum owed
to frontline workers.
While such a check might seem sufficient, there are
good reasons for citizens to instead provide welfare as
needs arise. As noted, when many benefactors are
owed gratitude, the upper costs they are entitled to
vary depending on cobenefactors’ needs, as when only
one lifeguard needs expensive cancer treatment, versus
all needing such treatment. Because needs change
across time, it can be difficult to know the help a given
benefactor is entitled to at a given time. Providing
frontline workers help based on need (as with normal
welfare provisions) avoids scenarios where some are
given money not covering important needs, while
others are denied help to cover important needs.
There is a related problem with a one-off check. As
notedwith Charles, a beneficiary needn’t provide aid to
a benefactor if then unable to help someone he has
weightier competing reasons to help instead. States can
account for this consideration by providing aid as needs
arise. For example, if a state could provide housing to
homeless frontline workers, but has weightier reasons
to provide cancer treatment to nonfrontline-workers,
and it can afford to provide either housing or cancer
treatment, it ought to provide the latter alone. It fails to
do so if preemptively handing out checks covering
housing frontline workers might later need; the state
cannot easily take back the checks if later learning that
a more pressing duty has arisen. To systematically
weigh competing considerations, workers should be
subject to a welfare policy, rather than a one-off check.
Even if one rejects this conclusion, one can at least
accept this: if frontline workers are not given a large
check equal to the minimum threshold owed, they have
grounds for not only permanent residency, but welfare
provisions equaling or above this threshold.
The argument thus far focuses on migrants, but it
seems citizen frontline workers assuming supereroga-
tory risks are also owed gratitude. This poses a prob-
lem: when frontline migrants and citizens assume
similar risks, it is not clear why frontline migrants are
given a distinct benefit of permanent residency. Put
another way: if permanent residency for frontline
migrants is a substantial benefit compared to their
current circumstances, while citizen frontline workers
are not given such a substantial benefit compared to
their current circumstances, citizens would be provided
fewer gratitude-based benefits relative to their current
circumstances. This seems inconsistent.
One response is to reject the claim that, when mul-
tiple individuals are owed similar gratitude, benefits
owed must be similar as well. If Beatrice is Charles’
wife, already owing her assistance should she find
5 I presume frontline workers would also eventually have a right to
citizenship, including voting rights, further empowering them to
communicate with citizens on a public level. However, gratitude
may be insufficient for citizenship rights until frontline workers have
lived a minimal number of years in the country. Those frontline
workers who have already lived in the country for a given number

























































































































herself in need, his duties of gratitude might not gen-
erate new duties of assistance. In the original case
where Beatrice is not his wife, he does owe her assist-
ance he otherwise would not, but this is consistent;
sometimes a reason one owes certain goods can be
overdetermined for some and not others, such that
some and not others will gain new benefits when taking
on comparable risks. Citizen frontline workers are
already owed permanent residency, so they would
benefit less than frontline workers, but this is consistent
with the claim that frontline workers are owed
gratitude-based permanent residency.
There is a second potential reasonmigrants are owed
permanent residency, even if many citizen take on
similar risks: the risks migrants face may be farther
from baseline risks they have duties to accept. For
example, even if no nurse is morally obligated to
assume a 1/100 chance of dying, citizen nurses might
still be obligated to assume greater risks than migrant
nurses, such that when a migrant and citizen both
assume a 1/100 chance of dying from COVID-19, the
difference between the migrant’s risks and her obliga-
tory baseline is greater than the difference between the
citizen’s risks and her obligatory baseline. If risks
migrants assume are farther from their obligatory base-
line, granting them permanent residency is justified
even if citizens’ gratitude-based benefits are not as
great compared to their current circumstances.
Why might citizens have a higher obligatory baseline?
Perhaps citizenship confers benefits, and benefits create
duties—such as the duty to take on risks—not held by
nonbeneficiaries (Moore 2009). Alternatively, perhaps
citizens have duties to assume greater risks to show
solidarity to conationals. Such solidarity might be intrin-
sically valuable, or valuable when encouraging the fulfil-
ment of certain cosmopolitan goals (Brock 2002; Hurka
1997;Moore 2009; Seglow2013). If citizens have aduty to
assume more risks, this could justify granting special
benefits to migrants in virtue of risks migrants assume.
If special benefits are warranted, and so permanent
residency justified, this would have implications in a
range of countries. The Canadian and French govern-
ments have already announced the granting of perman-
ent residency for some frontline workers. Up to 50,000
can qualify in Canada, and though only 700 have quali-
fied so far in France (Government of Canada 2021;
Méheut 2020), far more have moral grounds for
remaining permanently, including some of the roughly
276,000 agricultural workers in the country (Augère-
Granier 2021). While those taking risks to avoid
destitution are not owed gratitude-based permanent
residency, those taking risks freely or to help others
are. The same applies to some or all of the approxi-
mately 200,000 agricultural workers in the US onH-2A
visas (Flocks 2020), approximately 200,000 agriculture
workers in Italy on six-months visas (Isaac and Elrick
2020), and 40,000–80,000 seasonal agricultural workers
in theUK.6 It would additionally apply to potentially all
29,010 health care workers in the UK given temporary
visas between 2017 and 2019 (Sumption and Kierans
2019), and approximately 25,500 health care workers in
the US on H1-B visas or without Green Cards (Painter
2020).
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS
While implications for many authorized migrants are
clear, implications for unauthorized migrants are not.
This is because gratitude-based arguments presumed
consent: citizens would consent to risks frontline work-
ers assume, and so the consent condition for gratitude is
met. This assumption may be untrue for migrants
without visas, including over five million agricultural
workers in the US (Budiman 2020; Dudley 2020) and
roughly 100,000 in Italy (D’Ignoti 2020; Isaac and
Elrick 2020). While citizens might consent to such
workers tacitly—for example, Brock (2020, 96) and
Rubio-Marìn (2000, 83) suggest citizens tacitly consent
to undocumented workers if knowingly benefiting from
their work and raising no opposition—this is contro-
versial. It is controversial to claim that knowingly bene-
fiting and not opposing are sufficient for tacit consent
(Pevnik 2011, 167; Song 2018, 182–3). Even if they are,
most citizens might not knowingly benefit from
unauthorized frontline workers. They might therefore
give neither tacit nor “hypothetical consent”; if asked,
they would not consent to unauthorized workers pick-
ing fruit or collecting waste.
Even if citizens would not consent if asked in a simple
manner, they might still consent in a world where other
conditions were different. More specifically, they might
give hypothetical consent in two ways:
1. Citizens might consent if given information on risks
frontline workers face and benefits they provide and
2. Citizens might consent if they did not hold xenopho-
bic views.
Inwhat follows, I demonstrate that circumstance (1) is
sufficient for fulfilling the consent condition for grati-
tude, but not necessarily circumstance (2). However, in
both circumstances, and even when citizens would not
consent with full information and no xenophobia, grati-
tude may still be owed when frontline workers cannot
reasonably knowwhat citizenswould consent to if asked.
To defend the first claim—that the consent condition
of gratitude is fulfilled in case (1)—I begin with a
premise concerning autonomy: a benefactor assuming
supererogatory risks is owed gratitude if respecting the
beneficiary’s autonomy. This is why it matters that
Charles would have consented to Beatrice saving his
life if asked: it matters that Beatrice is saving Charles’
life in a manner that he autonomously desires, rather
than against his wishes. If so, this raises the question of
6 This is a broad estimate, but there is no broadly accepted precise
number. See Department of Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs
(DEFRA) 2020a; 2020b and Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs
Committee (EFRAC) 2020.
























































































































what sort of hypothetical consent indicates that auton-
omy is respected.
A recent theory of consent sheds light on this ques-
tion. According to David Enoch, hypothetical consent
protects autonomy if features removed in the hypothet-
ical scenario are not features the consent-giver endorses
and views as part of their identity (Enoch 2017).
For example, imagine Charles would not have con-
sented to being saved if asked because he has strongly
endorsed religion commitments that prohibit being
saved. In a hypothetical world where he lacked these
commitments, he would consent to being saved. This
sort of hypothetical consent does not indicate that saving
Charles respects his autonomy. For, in a world where he
did not hold these commitments, an important aspect of
his identity would be different. Saving him based on this
hypothetical world would not be respecting the auton-
omy of Charles in this world. In contrast, imagine that
Charles would not have consented toBeatrice saving his
life if asked because he is temporarily confused and
thinks Beatrice can’t swim, but would have consented
if he knewBeatrice could swim. It seems Beatrice ought
to save his life, assuming believing Beatrice cannot swim
is not central to his self-conception. Saving him would
respect his autonomy, and not the autonomy of some
distant variant of Charles.
The above has implications for gratitude. Not only
does Beatrice respect Charles’ autonomy by saving him
if he would consent when aware she can swim; it seems
Charles owes her gratitude, given that he benefited
whilst having his autonomy respected.
This, in turn, has implications for frontline workers.
If citizens are unaware of frontline migrants’s assist-
ance and risks they assume, citizens are unlikely to view
their ignorance as essential to their identities. If they
don’t, removing this ignorance in the hypothetical
scenario, and then asking what citizens would consent
to in this scenario—in other words, asking if they would
consent if given accurate information—is the right sort
of question for establishing whether migrants are
respecting citizens’ autonomy. If citizens would consent
to undocumented migrants working if aware of risks
assumed and contributions provided, these workers
respect citizens’ autonomy. If undocumented workers
assume supererogatory risks while respecting citizens’
autonomy, citizens owe them duties of gratitude.
In reality, many citizens would not consent to some
or all frontline workers continuing their work evenwith
accurate information. This is sometimes because of
xenophobia and/or racism. We might think hypothet-
ical consent is obtained so long as citizens would con-
sent if not xenophobic or racist, because hypothetical
consent can be obtained if onewould consent were they
to hold no wrongful views. For example, if Charles is
sexist, and so would not consent to being saved if asked,
perhaps Beatrice still respects his autonomy when
saving his life. He therefore owes Beatrice gratitude,
at least if grateful to be alive.
While the above may be true, it is controversial. This
is because forcing individuals to accept life-saving inter-
ventions is wrong even if their motives are wrong. A
sexist patient is permitted to refuse surgery to avoid
having a woman conduct the surgery. If he is forced to
accept this surgery, he is wronged, and so perhaps owes
no gratitude. Hypothetical consent may work similarly,
and a patient would owe no gratitude if the doctor
performed surgery despite knowing he would have
objected for wrongful reasons. Citizens who have
objectionable xenophobia may be blameworthy, and
perhaps undocumentedworkers ought to be given visas
if undocumented because of xenophobia, but they are
not owed permanent residency by virtue of citizens
autonomously benefiting.
The above logic is clearer when citizens’motives are
not objectionable. Imagine increases in undocumented
workers cause spikes in rental prices, and citizens
prefer to adopt increased risks than suffer higher rental
prices. Their views could be nonwrongful and autono-
mously derived, such that migrant workers are not
providing citizens an autonomous benefit. Autono-
mous benefits, therefore, cannot explain why citizens
owe such workers gratitude.
This leads to a question: whether autonomous bene-
fits are always necessary for owing gratitude. While
protecting autonomy may be part of a jointly sufficient
set of conditions for gratitude—X owes gratitude to Y if
Y assumes supererogatory risks for him and his auton-
omy is respected—perhaps autonomy is not necessary
when a benefactor cannot know what a beneficiary
would consent to if asked. If Charles would not have
consented to Beatrice saving her life, but she cannot
know this fact, she may not actually protect his auton-
omy, but in saving his life she nonculpably responds to
what she reasonably thinks he wants. Charles has good
reason to show her gratitude, given that she demon-
strated concern for his welfare without intentionally
usurping his autonomy. At least, he has good reason to
show her gratitude if he is grateful to be alive. Many
frontlineworkers likely do not knowwhat citizenswould
want, especially during an emergency before polls have
been conducted. If they reasonably presume citizens
want frontline migrants to continue their work, then
even if they do not actually respect the autonomy of
citizens, they do the best they can. Gratitude may there-
fore still be owed, and with it permanent residency.
In contrast, if migrants can reasonably know that
fully informed citizens would not consent to their work
if asked, such migrants’ grounds for gratitude are more
ambiguous. This is consistent with the claim that such
migrants have other grounds for permanent residency,
derived from alternative values.
THREE ALTERNATIVE VALUES
This section presents the values of reciprocity, mem-
bership, and equality as grounding rights to permanent
residency. The latter two values explain why many
frontline workers not owed gratitude are owed per-
manent residency. Some might suppose these two val-
ues justify permanent residency for all frontline
workers. I demonstrate this is not the case; a full
account of rights for frontline workers must appeal to


























































































































It is commonly claimed that if someone has contributed
to society through taxes and interactions with others,
she has a reciprocal claim to reap benefits in return
(Rubio-Marin 2000; Shachar 2009; Song 2018). This is
because of a broader principle of “fair play”: it is only
fair that those contributing to a cooperative scheme
reap benefits from this scheme, even if many who
benefit have not consented (Song 2018). This seems
particularly true when contributions entail risks. As
noted by Michael J Sullivan, migrants accepting bur-
dens can be owed compensation (Sullivan 2019, 19),
with those risking their lives—such as soldiers—
engaging in acts that are particularly burdensome,
and so particularly deserving of permanent residency.7
Frontline workers might similarly have grounds to
permanent residency in virtue of their contributions
and risks, even if lacking citizens’ hypothetical consent.
The above argument, however, rests on a shaky
premise; duties of reciprocity might not be owed for
benefits one never consented to obtain. This skepticism
is shared by Sullivan, who argues that contributions
from unauthorized migrants are not grounds for per-
manent residency without the consent of a special
“community sentencing board” (Sullivan 2019,
24, 31). In contrast, the gratitude-based argument
explains why many unauthorized migrants ought to
be given permanent residency even if lacking citizens’
consent: sometimes we can owe gratitude to individuals
even if we never explicitly consented to their help. In
this sense, the reciprocity-based argument fails to
expand the set of frontline workers owed permanent
residency beyond those owed gratitude, and may cap-
ture a narrower set of workers.
Membership
A second alternative argument appeals to “social
membership”: with time migrants integrate into soci-
ety, building valuable relationships that can only be
sustained with the right to remain permanently (Carens
2013, 103; Song 2018, 186–8). While time is sufficient
for social membership, it might not be necessary for
some. For example, the French government permits
members of the French Foreign Legion (FFL)—a mili-
tary unit that recruits foreign nationals—to obtain
French citizenship after only three years (Ferrillo
2012). This policy could be justified because recruits
demonstrate strong ties to fellow recruits, including
French citizens, in shorter amounts of time. If strong
ties in shorter amounts of time ground permanent
residency rights, perhaps most citizens’ consent is
unnecessary for permanent residency rights. For
example, caretakers during COVID-19 may have
strong relationships with those they assist from remain-
ing in their homes throughout the pandemic, and some
hospital technicians might gain deep ties with
coworkers, regardless of whether citizens consent to
risks technicians assume. Importantly, such ties could
emerge even among workers admitting to taking non-
obligatory risks solely to avoid life-threatening destitu-
tion, and so not owed gratitude.
We might make similar claims about frontline work-
ers without deep interpersonal relationships, but with
ties of trust between themselves and citizens they never
meet. Broader studies find that those saving others can
be heralded as trusted members by the community
(Hardie and Critchly 2008), and many citizens seem
to feel this way about frontline workers, expressing
solidarity with nurses, cleaners, and doctors
(Morrison 2020). If this is evidence of valuable ties
between citizens and frontline workers, frontline work-
ers have membership-based grounds for permanent
residency.
A secondmembership-based argument leads to simi-
lar conclusions. According to Ayelet Shachar and Ran
Hirschl, some workers have “social connectedness”
(Shachar 2009; Shachar and Hirschl 2014), becoming
interdependent with state structures (Shachar 2009,
168–71). For example, a person might depend on
streets to commute and pay taxes contributing to
streets. The longer a person lives in a country, the more
such interdependence constitutes a political relation-
ship with citizens, encouraging the person to value the
common good, generating a right to citizenship
(Shachar and Hirschl 2014, 250). Frontline workers in
the country for a short time might highly depend on
state infrastructure to work, as when delivery drivers
depend on roads and are depended upon by citizens to
decrease the virus’s spread. When such interdepend-
ence indicates they are committed to the common
good, they have grounds for remaining permanently
even if most citizens would not consent to their work.
While membership-based arguments ground per-
manent residency for many frontline workers not owed
gratitude, they do not capture all frontline workers.
Some lack close relationships with citizens or commit-
ments to the common good, but have gratitude-based
grounds to remain. Such might be the case for a doctor
without concern for those she helps or close ties with
others, but who freely assumes supererogatory risks
with citizens’ hypothetical consent.
Moreover, membership-based arguments struggle to
justify permanent residency for workers taking risks to
avoid being fired and destitute, never claiming other-
wise. Such workers are neither owed gratitude nor
necessarily expressing commitments to the common
good, some marginalized from society and so holding
no ties with citizens. If such workers still have rights to
remain, it is because they experience inequality and
exploitation.
Inequality and Exploitation
This argument begins with a broad premise concerning
inequality: inequality is often unjust, though precisely
when is up for debate.Luck Egalitarians claim inequal-
ity is unjust when some are worse off due to brute luck
(Dworkin 2002; Segall 2013). Sufficientarians claim that
7 This reasoning provides justification for the former US policy of
granting permanent residency to unauthorized migrants joining the
military (Sullivan 2019).
























































































































inequality is unjust whenever some cannot live suffi-
ciently decent lives (Axelsen and Nielsen 2015; Huseby
2020). Prioritarians claim that inequality is unjust when
resources are distributedmerely tomaximize aggregate
benefits, because benefits ought to count for more the
worse off an agent is (Parfit 2012; Peterson and Hans-
son 2005).Relational Egalitarians hold that inequality is
unjust when creating unequal relationships, as when
the wealthy dominate the poor (Anderson 1999).
These are simplistic summaries of prominent views,
and there are more, but assuming inequality is clearly
unjust when all of the above principles are violated,
many frontline workers lacking gratitude-based
grounds have their rights violated. Those paid little
and lacking protective equipment can suffer from
anxiety incompatible with a sufficiently decent life
(Spoorthy, Pratapa, and Mahantc 2020). If transfer-
ring resources to such workers would improve their
lives, their circumstances are likely incompatible with
Prioritarianism as well. Luck Egalitarianism is vio-
lated when frontline workers in low-pay industries
cannot easily switch professions because of lower
educational attainment (Rho, Brown, and Fremstad
2020), given that poverty in one’s youth—for which
one usually lacks control—can be an obstacle to edu-
cational attainment (Stumm et al. 2020). Violations of
Relational Egalitarianism are also rife, with many
frontline care workers facing abuse (Doward 2019)
and an inability to legally change employment, further
restricting their agency vis-à-vis employers (Isaac and
Elrick 2020).
In facing unjust inequality, many frontline workers
experience a related wrong: that of exploitation. While
there is disagreement over when exploitation occurs, it
is widely accepted that victims of unjust inequality can
become victims of unjust exploitation if others benefit
from the inequality they experience. For example, one
prominent view of exploitation holds that agents
exploit others if benefiting more than they would have,
had resources been fairly distributed (Roemer 2013).
Another view holds that agents exploit others if bene-
fiting excessively from “outrageous and lopsided terms
of exchange” that others accept because they have no
reasonable alternatives (Valdman 2009). Frontline
workers are likely victims of exploitation according to
both views, if accepting nonmorally obligatory risks
because they lack reasonable alternatives, due to unjust
inequality, resulting in citizens benefiting from reduced
risks.
When migrants suffer from wrongful inequality and
exploitation, permanent residency is an effective way of
mitigating this inequality and exploitation (Berg 2016;
Lenard and Straehle 2010; Walzer 1983). As Walzer
argued over three decades ago, many temporary work-
ers performing “socially necessary work” are domin-
ated by laws they have no control over, and permanent
residency and citizenship can counter this domination
(Walzer 1983, 60). If this is true in general, it is true for
frontline workers in particular, including those—
indeed especially those—who are clearly taking risks
solely to avoid life-threatening unemployment. An
individual fruit picker who admits to taking risks solely
to access necessities, which she cannot legally access in
alternative employment, is dominated by laws she has
no control over, while providing benefits for citizens.
Such benefits indicate that she is unjustly exploited, and
such exploitation can be mitigated if she is given the
right to change employment without fear of deport-
ation, the right to protest her position, and welfare
provisions should she find herself unemployed. These
are basic tenets of permanent residency, as defined
in the second section, and so she ought to be granted
permanent residency.
This argument may also justify permanent residency
for exploited unauthorized workers lacking hypothet-
ical consent from most citizens. Assuming states have a
duty to counter gross exploitation even when most
citizens have not consented to such exploitation, and
permanent residency can counter exploitation, such
workers have grounds for permanent residency.
While the above arguments justify permanent resi-
dency for many frontline workers, they do not capture
residency rights for all frontline workers. A doctor not
subject to wrongful exploitation or inequality should
still be shown gratitude for her supererogatory risks,
and so should still be given permanent residency.
The gratitude-based argument additionally explains
why some workers’ grounds to remain are overdeter-
mined, because they face inequality and are owed
gratitude. A nurse may be fired and destitute if she
refuses to take undue risks, but is assuming risks not
because of this threat, merely wishing to help others.
Some might claim she is not exploited, given that she
provides benefits not because she is threatened with
destitution, but she is still subject to wrongful inequality
via the threat she faces. She is additionally owed grati-
tude, given that she is assuming nonmorally obligatory
risks in order to help others. She therefore has both
inequality and gratitude-based grounds to remain.
BEYOND COVID-19
While principles of membership, equality, and nonex-
ploitation have garnered widespread attention in discus-
sions on immigration, principles of gratitude have been
largely neglected. Yet, gratitude is relevant beyond
COVID-19. Many workers benefit citizens via super-
erogatory risks, and so perhaps many have gratitude-
based grounds for permanent residency.
This is uncontroversial for someworkers.Migrants in
the military are already granted permanent residency
in a range of countries after serving a minimal number
of years (Sullivan 2019), with France waiving any time
requirement for FFL soldiers injured in battle (Ferrillo
2012). Assuming many injured have taken supereroga-
tory risks, this policy could be justified on gratitude-
based grounds. Gratitude could also explain France’s
broader policy of occasionally providing citizenship to
individuals participating in life-risking acts of kindness,
as when aMalianman climbed a building to save a child
dangling from a fourth-floor balcony (Vandoorne,
Breech, and Westcott 2018). In this sense, the case for

























































































































case for expanding gratitude-based residency beyond
soldiers and those engaging in random acts of kind-
ness.8
The case can be expanded to include additional
migrants. Consider firefighters and health workers par-
ticipating in long night shifts that reduce life expectancy
(Laroche and L’Espérance 2021; Vetter et al. 2016). It
may be that many are owed gratitude for assuming
supererogatory risks. Nonresidents living abroad may
be owed similar gratitude, and sometimes are granted
residency rights for this reason. For example, the UK
government granted residency to nearly 100,000 Nep-
alese soldiers serving as Gurkhas in the UK military
(Pariyar 2020), and the US government granted resi-
dency to roughly 26,000 Afghan and Iraqi interpreters
and their dependents (Radford and Krogstad 2017). If
individuals living abroad can be owed gratitude, per-
haps even more individuals are owed gratitude-based
residency, such as West African health care workers
who worked during the Ebola pandemic (WHO 2015),
potentially increasing life-expectancy in high-income
countries by decreasing the virus’s spread.
While manyworkers are owed gratitude, this needn’t
imply a duty to grant all such workers permanent
residency.
As noted in previous sections, there are limits to costs
individuals must bear in showing gratitude, and this
applies to groups: when many risk their lives to save
many individuals at sea, costs should be allocated fairly
between beneficiaries, and if many beneficiaries refuse
to cooperate, there is still an upper cost any beneficiary
must bear. This has implications for states: a single state
may have no duty to grant permanent residency to all
owed gratitude—including those abroad—when the
costs this imposes are beyond those citizens are obli-
gated to bear. This could be the case if certain employ-
ment sectors or public services would be strained.
When this occurs, all states with benefiting citizens
should cooperate to allocate residency permits to those
owed gratitude, limiting costs any states’ citizens must
bear.When impossible, a given state is still permitted to
limit the number given permanent residency if this
prevents costs from rising above the obligatory thresh-
old for gratitude. While the threshold is greater than
had the state’s citizens not benefited, this threshold is
still finite.
When limits are justified, this raises the question of
who should be prioritized. There are good reasons to
prioritize workers living in the country. There are
distinctmembership-based harms imposed on someone
forced to leave a state they are residing in compared
with harms imposed on someone denied entrance to a
state they have never lived in before. As noted in the
last section, frontline workers are interacting regularly
with state institutions and often citizens. Given these
interactions, when subject to deportation, the harm
they experience is generally greater than the harm of
someone who never lived in the state, all else being
equal. If the harm is greater, and the duty of gratitude
requires avoiding harm, then the duty to avoid deport-
ing migrants who risked their lives can be generally
weightier than the duty to admit nonresidents who
risked their lives.
While membership is one central consideration,
another is equality. As noted in the last section, an
individual can be owed gratitude and face unjust
inequality, and the same is true for individuals abroad.
An Afghan interpreter risking his life for the US mili-
tary may face wrongful inequality if denied basic neces-
sities should he refuse his services, but he is still owed
gratitude if his motives are solely to help the military.
There are good reasons to prioritize him for permanent
residency before a doctor working in the US, assuming
the doctor faces no unjust inequality. This seems espe-
cially true if the interpreter experiences inequality
alongside membership claims, holding strong ties with
US government institutions via his work.
There is a final consideration, related to what individ-
ual policymakers ought to do. Sometimes policymakers
prioritizing some individuals legitimizes, amongst
citizens, “an adjudication system that is … unjust to
everyone else” (Silverman 2016). For example, US
policymakers providing residency to Afghan interpret-
ers may have reinforced the idea that those not taking
risks were less deserving of residency rights. The popu-
larity of this idea can constrain policymakers’ ability to
protect other migrants’ rights. More specifically, policy-
makers granting permanent residency to those owed
gratitude, and attempting to respect rights for other
migrants, might fail to do so if their attempts quickly
cost them reelection.9 This worry, articulated by Maike
Isaac and Jennifer Elrick when discussing residency
rights for COVID-19 workers (2020, 8), is relevant
whenever somemigrants are deemed more worthy than
others.
To establish what ought to be done in such cases,
policymakers ought to consider who benefits andwho is
disadvantaged. If policymakers granting permanent
residency to some privileged frontline doctors means
they struggle to grant residency to far more refugees,
refugees should be prioritized. In contrast, when most
granted residency on gratitude-based grounds are also
fleeing life-threatening conditions—as is often true for
agricultural workers (Markham 2019; Pelek 2019)—
granting permanent residency may be acceptable even
if this makes resettling a smaller number of refugees
more difficult.
Moreover, it may be justified to grant permanent
residency to a set of frontline workers when this
improves citizens’ general attitudes toward migrants.
This effect may arise during COVID-19, if COVID-19
is what Bonnie Honig calls a “transformative” emer-
gency, in the sense of encouraging support for8 Of course, many soldiers assume greater risks than many frontline
workers, but even soldiers facing lower risks far from the frontlines
are granted permanent residency (Sullivan 2019). So long as frontline
workers face nonobligatory risks, they have similar grounds to many
soldiers.
9 Political parties may also constrain policymakers’ actions
(Hampshire 2013).
























































































































experimentation and change (Honig 2014, 52). Histor-
ically, such experimentation and change has expanded
the set of individuals given citizenship-associated rights
beyond those owed gratitude, when citizens viewed the
emergency as an opportunity to protect democracy and
equality (Davenport et al. 2019). For example, the post-
WWI UK government extended the franchise to all
men to show gratitude for fighting in the war (Gottlieb
and Toye 2013), but later expanded the franchise to
women in 1928. More directly related to migration,
post-WWII Canada extended rights to Chinese immi-
grants on similar grounds of having fought in the war,
expanding rights to far more migrants by 1962 (Roy
2011). There is some evidence that COVID-19 can
expand the provision of rights to far more migrants.
According to Isaac and Elrick, COVID-19 has height-
ened awareness of migrants’ general contributions,
with resistance to calling agricultural workers “low
skilled” (Isaac and Elrick 2020). If the pandemic
has shifted perceptions of what “skilled” means,
popularizing the idea that many migrants are owed
gratitude—beyond those assuming risks during the
pandemic—perhaps permanent residency to frontline
workers will help rather than harm the status of other
migrants. Establishing if this is true requires empirical
research, but such research is essential precisely
because of the value of gratitude at stake.
CONCLUSION
This article presented the case for granting permanent
residency to frontline workers, appealing not only to
traditional values of membership, equality, and non-
exploitation, but to the value of gratitude. Gratitude
is additionally owed to other workers at home and
abroad, though limiting the number granted
gratitude-based rights is justified when costs are suffi-
ciently high. In such cases, states ought to prioritize
those residing within the state and victims of gross
inequality.
Though gratitude-based claims are narrowed by
cost-related considerations, this value still has broad
implications. Philosophers have traditionally focused
on migrants integrating and contributing to society,
rather than risks they assume. While risks are evoked
for refugees—those experiencing risks at home need
asylum abroad (Brock 2020; Carens 2013; Pevnick
2011; Song 2018)—risks are not only relevant for those
fleeing wars, famine, and poverty. They are addition-
ally relevant for those assuming risks while benefiting
citizens. Accounting for such benefits expands the
range of considerations for immigration policies, and
it highlights the ways that migrants are not merely
passive actors in need, but active agents providing for
citizens’ needs.
Of course, focusing on citizens’ needs is not entirely
new; many countries grant permanent residency to
migrants who sacrifice for their adopted country. How-
ever, the migrants granted such residency are limited to
soldiers, interpreters, and a Malian refugee saving a
child dangling from a building. Far more individuals
have grounds to remain due to dangers previously
overlooked. COVID-19 magnified these dangers, dem-
onstrating what is owed to those participating in acts
not traditionally deemed heroic. This focus on seem-
ingly unheroic acts broadens the debate, demonstrating
that migrants are wronged not only when their migra-
tion status poses risks to themselves, but when they are
denied gratitude for assuming risks for others.
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